Besner, Manfred (2020): Values for level structures with polynomialtime algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations.
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Abstract
Exponential runtimes of algorithms for values for games with transferable utility like the Shapley value are one of the biggest obstacles in the practical application of otherwise axiomatically convincing solution concepts of cooperative game theory. We investigate to what extent the hierarchical structure of a level structure improves runtimes compared to an unstructured player set. Representatively, we examine the Shapley levels value, the nested Shapley levels value, and, as a new value for level structures, the nested Owen levels value. For these values, we provide polynomialtime algorithms (under normal conditions) which are exact and therefore not approximation algorithms. Moreover, we introduce relevant coalition functions where all coalitions that are not relevant for the payoff calculation have a Harsanyi dividend of zero. Our results shed new light on the computation of values of the Harsanyi set as the Shapley value and many values from extensions of this set.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Values for level structures with polynomialtime algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Cooperative game · Polynomialtime algorithm · Level structure · (Nested) Shapley/Owen (levels) value · Harsanyi dividends 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71  Cooperative Games 
Item ID:  101464 
Depositing User:  Manfred Besner 
Date Deposited:  05 Jul 2020 18:57 
Last Modified:  05 Jul 2020 18:57 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/101464 
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Values for level structures with polynomialtime algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations. (deposited 30 Mar 2020 11:18)
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