Tools and approaches in public contracting research

Moszoro, Marian W. (2018): Tools and approaches in public contracting research. Published in: A Research Agenda for New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley. Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK. Chapter 10 (2018): pp. 88-96.

Abstract

What makes contracting in public organizations different from contracting in private organizations? This essay explores advances in research at the intersection of contract theory and behavioral political economics. The main challenges consist of identifying and measuring the trade-offs that arise due to the interaction of agents under public oversight and political competition. It highlights theoretical models that address accountability and public managers’ discretionary contractual choices, as well as empirical tools for causal inference in public-private contracting.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Procurement, public-private contracting, political economy, causal inference
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights; L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L32 - Public Enterprises ; Public-Private Enterprises; L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out

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