Harsanyi support levels solutions

Besner, Manfred (2020): Harsanyi support levels solutions.

Abstract

We introduce a new class of values with transferable utility for level structures. In these hierarchical structures, each level corresponds to a partition of the player set, which becomes increasingly coarse from the trivial partition containing only singletons to the partition containing only the grand coalition. The new values, called Harsanyi support levels solutions, extend the Harsanyi solutions to level structures. As an important subset of these values, we present the class of weighted Shapley support levels values as a further result. The values from this class extend the weighted Shapley values to level structures and contain the Shapley levels value as a special case. Axiomatizations of the studied classes are provided.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Cooperative game ; Level structure ; (Weighted) Shapley (levels) value ; Harsanyi set ; Dividends
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

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