Canegrati, Emanuele (2006): Political Bad Reputation.
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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to explore how the connection between political ideology and voters’ preferences is able to generate different equilibria in a yardstick competition game, where good incumbents are forced to create a bad reputation or, in other words, to mimic the bad incumbents’ behavior in order to win the elections in a two-candidate political competition.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | Political Bad Reputation |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation |
| Item ID: | 1018 |
| Depositing User: | Emanuele Canegrati |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Dec 2006 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 16:38 |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/1018 |
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