Salvadori, Neri and De Francesco, Massimo A. (2020): BertrandEdgeworth oligopoly: Characterization of mixed strategy equilibria when some firms are large and the others are small.

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Abstract
This paper studies BertrandEdgeworth competition among firms producing a homogeneous commodity under efficient rationing and constant (andidentical across firms) marginal cost until full capacity utilization is reached. Our focus is on a subset of the no purestrategy equilibrium region of the capacity space in which, in a welldefined sense, some firms are large and the others are small. We characterize equilibria for such subset. For each firm, the payoffs are the same at any equilibrium and, for each type of firm, they are proportional to capacity. While there is a single profile of equilibrium distributions for the large firms, there is a continuum of equilibrium distributions for the small firms: what is uniquely determined, for the latter, is the capacityweighted sum of their equilibrium distributions and hence the union of the supports of their equilibrium strategies.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  BertrandEdgeworth oligopoly: Characterization of mixed strategy equilibria when some firms are large and the others are small 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  BertrandEdgeworth oligopoly; mixed strategy equilibrium; large and small firms 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games D  Microeconomics > D4  Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43  Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L  Industrial Organization > L1  Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13  Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets 
Item ID:  102274 
Depositing User:  Neri Salvadori 
Date Deposited:  13 Aug 2020 07:54 
Last Modified:  13 Aug 2020 07:54 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/102274 