The Relativity Theory Revisited: Is Publishing Interest Rate Forecasts Really so Valuable?

Brzoza-Brzezina, Michal and Kot, Adam (2008): The Relativity Theory Revisited: Is Publishing Interest Rate Forecasts Really so Valuable?

Abstract

In a New Keynesian model with asymmetric information we show that publication of macroeconomic projections and of the future interest rate path by the central bank can improve macroeconomic outcomes. However, the gains from publishing interest rate paths are small relative to those from publishing macroeconomic projections. Given that most inflation targeting central banks are already publishing macroeconomic projections this means that most gains from increasing transparency in this area may already have been reaped. This, together with the potential costs, may explain the relative reluctance of central banks to publish interest rate paths.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: interest rate path; monetary policy; adaptive learning
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E43 - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy

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