Canidio, Andrea (2018): Financial incentives for the development of blockchain-based platforms.
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Abstract
A developer creates a new blockchain-based decentralized digital platform by investing resources and exerting costly effort. Performing exchanges on the platform is possible only by using a new crypto-token. The initial stock of this token is owned by the developer, who can sells some in an Initial Coin Offering (ICO), and more later on a frictionless financial market. I show that, if the developer raises funds via an ICO, then in every subsequent period with strictly positive probability he may liquidate his tokens and stop the development of the platform. Even if the developer does need to hold an ICO, the equilibrium will nonetheless be inefficient because the developer's payoff depends on the volume of transaction on the decentralized digital platform in each period. Instead, the social value of the platform depends on the present discounted value of the total surplus created. The developer's effort and investment could be above or below their optimal levels, depending on the discount factor and the elasticity of supply/demand of the users of the platform.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Financial incentives for the development of blockchain-based platforms |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Blockchain, decentralized digital platforms, Initial Coin Offering (ICO), Tokenomics, seigniorage, innovation, incentives, open source. |
Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L17 - Open Source Products and Markets L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L26 - Entrepreneurship O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives |
Item ID: | 103804 |
Depositing User: | dr Andrea Canidio |
Date Deposited: | 28 Oct 2020 11:32 |
Last Modified: | 28 Oct 2020 11:32 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/103804 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 24 Mar 2018 23:44)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 05 Apr 2018 15:27)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 21 Jul 2018 15:34)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 25 Jul 2018 12:17)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 28 Aug 2018 18:24)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 03 Oct 2018 16:19)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 12 May 2019 10:34)
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Financial incentives for the development of blockchain-based platforms. (deposited 31 Jul 2020 08:47)
- Financial incentives for the development of blockchain-based platforms. (deposited 28 Oct 2020 11:32) [Currently Displayed]
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Financial incentives for the development of blockchain-based platforms. (deposited 31 Jul 2020 08:47)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 12 May 2019 10:34)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 03 Oct 2018 16:19)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 28 Aug 2018 18:24)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 25 Jul 2018 12:17)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 21 Jul 2018 15:34)
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Financial incentives for open source development: the case of Blockchain. (deposited 05 Apr 2018 15:27)