International Coordination of Debt Rules with Time-inconsistent Voters

Arawatari, Ryo and Ono, Tetsuo (2020): International Coordination of Debt Rules with Time-inconsistent Voters.

Abstract

In this study, we investigate the international coordination of debt rules in an economy consisting of a large number of countries with varying degrees of present bias. A case whereby each country sets its own uncoordinated debt rules is compared with a case whereby all countries have common coordinated debt rules. Countries with weak present-biased preferences increase their debt issuance and suffer from welfare losses by participating in coordination. In contrast, countries with strong present-biased preferences reduce their debt issuance and can enjoy welfare improvement by participating in coordination. The contrasting results suggest the possibility that the former have little incentive to follow the coordinated rule.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Debt rules; Debt ceilings; Present bias; International coordination
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H62 - Deficit ; Surplus; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt

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