Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Horizontal contracts in a dominant firm-competitive fringe model

Antelo, Manel and Bru, Lluís (2021): Horizontal contracts in a dominant firm-competitive fringe model.

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Abstract

This paper offers a rationale for production subcontracting by a market power firm from smaller firms despite the latter’s ability to sell the good for themselves. Particularly, in a dominant firm (DF) model in which the good can be sold through linear pricing or through nonlinear two-part tariff (2PT) contracts, we demonstrate that the DF finds it optimal, whenever it sells its own production plus outsourced production, to subcontract production from fringe firms by setting nonlinear 2PT contracts.

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