Mitsopoulos, Michael and Pelagidis, Theodore (2006): State monopoly in higher education as a rent seeking industry. Published in: Journal of Educational Planning and Administration , Vol. XX, No. 3 (2006)
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Abstract
In Greece, the provision of tertiary education is permitted, by the constitution, only to "public" institutions where faculty and administrators are civil servants and public officials respectively. We construct an argument and present statistical data that describe the situation observed in Greece, where the community of higher education providers decides in the name of the whole society on the extent to which the provision of these services is a (state) monopoly. We see that in the context of our argument the society has to override the decision of the educational community regarding the provision of these services if it desires to see the community of educational services providers to allocate more time towards their profession and less time towards rent protection and/or extraction. We argue that once reform, that is the removal of the state monopoly, is introduced the educational community will allocate more effort towards educational related activities and less effort towards rent protection while at the same time it will accept a new "equilibrium" in which education related activities are rewarded more generously.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | State monopoly in higher education as a rent seeking industry |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Higher Education, Policy Reforms, Rent Seeking, Greece |
Subjects: | I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I23 - Higher Education ; Research Institutions |
Item ID: | 106957 |
Depositing User: | Theodore Pelagidis |
Date Deposited: | 03 Apr 2021 07:34 |
Last Modified: | 03 Apr 2021 07:34 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/106957 |