Benatia, David and Billette de Villemeur, Etienne (2019): Strategic Reneging in Sequential Imperfect Markets.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the incentives to manipulate sequential markets by strategically reneging on forward commitments. We first study the behaviour of a dominant firm in a two-period model with demand uncertainty. Our results show that sequential markets may be a source of inefficiencies. We then use the model’s predictions to investigate occurrences of reneging on long-term commitments in Alberta’s electricity market. We develop a machine learning approach to evaluate manipulations. We find that a dominant supplier increased its revenues by $35 million during the winter of 2010-11, causing Alberta’s electricity procurement costs to increase by above $330 million (20%).
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Strategic Reneging in Sequential Imperfect Markets |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Imperfect Commitment; Market Manipulation; MarketPower; Electricity Markets |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L94 - Electric Utilities |
Item ID: | 111090 |
Depositing User: | Etienne Billette de Villemeur |
Date Deposited: | 16 Dec 2021 02:26 |
Last Modified: | 16 Dec 2021 02:26 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/111090 |
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Strategic Reneging in Sequential Imperfect Markets. (deposited 15 Jan 2021 01:49)
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