Myopic Oligopoly Pricing

Bos, Iwan and Marini, Marco A. and Saulle, Riccardo (2021): Myopic Oligopoly Pricing.

Abstract

This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seekmyopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when capacities are large or small. For an intermediate range of capacities, it predicts a price interval that includes the mixedstrategy support. This stability concept thus encompasses all Nash equilibria and offers a pure-strategy solution when there is none in Nash terms. It particularly provides a behavioral rationale for different pricing patterns, including Edgeworth price cycles and states of hyper-competition with supply shortages. We also analyze the impact of a change in firm size distribution. A merger among the biggest firms may lead to more price dispersion as it increases the maximum and decreases the minimum myopically stable price.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Bounded Rationality, Capacity Constraints, Mergers, Myopic Stable Set, Oligopoly Pricing, Supply Shortages
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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