Inflation-Forecast Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?

PINSHI, Christian P. (2022): Inflation-Forecast Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?

Abstract

This article provides an overview of inflation-forecast targeting (IFT) to build credibility and maintain stability. We show how inflation-forecast targeting is a transparent approach and an ideal strategy for monetary policy. In addition, public understanding would be essential to foster confidence and ensure the effectiveness of monetary policy. To this end, adequate management of expectations and transparent communication are important.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Inflation-Forecast Targeting, Expectations, Communication, Monetary policy
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E47 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies

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