Wage-rise contract and mixed Cournot duopoly competition with profit-maximizing and socially concerned firms

Ohnishi, Kazuhiro (2022): Wage-rise contract and mixed Cournot duopoly competition with profit-maximizing and socially concerned firms.

Abstract

This paper investigates a Cournot game model with a nonlinear demand function where a profit-maximizing firm competes against a socially concerned firm. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage one, each firm non-cooperatively decides whether to offer a wage-rise contract policy as a strategic commitment device. In stage two, after observing the rival’s decision in stage one, each firm non-cooperatively chooses its actual output. The paper presents the equilibrium solutions of the model.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Cournot model; Corporate social responsibility; Profit-maximizing firm; Socially concerned firm; Wage-rise contract
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L20 - General

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