Institutions and the Resource Curse in GCC countries

Selahmi, Basma and Liu, Chunping (2022): Institutions and the Resource Curse in GCC countries.

Abstract

This paper investigates whether natural resource revenues in the GCC countries lead to economic growth or if the resource curse is evident. Using panel data for six countries during 1996-2019, we investigate the indirect relationship in which natural resources and economic growth operate through different institutional qualities. Using two different classifications of export composition, we show that point-source resources, particularly fuel exportation, worsen the economic performance of a country. In contrast, diffuse-source resources do not follow this pattern. Nevertheless, the results also provide the threshold level of institutional, beyond which fuel wealth enhances economic growth. This result suggests that for fuel exportation to have a meaningful impact on economic growth, GCC countries must attain a certain threshold of institutional quality. The results confirm our hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse, therefore contrasting the claims of Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) that institutions do not play a role. It, therefore, suggests that countries must adopt appropriate policy measures to improve their levels of institutional quality and soften the impact of a resource curse.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: C5; E02; N5; O4
• Subjects: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

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