Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties

Langlais, Eric (2005): Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties.

Abstract

The paper addresses the issue of the impact of asymmetric information on risk aversion of litigant parties in a model à la Bebchuk. First we study the case where the plaintif is the informed party, and characterize the equilibrium with and without a pretrial negociation round. Then, we focuse on the comparative statics of the model and analyse the role of the choice of a cost allocation rule. Finally, we discuss several extensions: the case where the defendant is the informed party, the influence of the assumption on the representation of preferences, and the role of self-serving bias.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Compensation of damages and frequency of trials with asymmetric information on preferences of litigant parties
• Language: French
• Keywords: litigation; asymmetric information on preferences; self-serving bias
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law > K10 - General; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K41 - Litigation Process; K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law > K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K40 - General; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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