Two-player bargaining problems with unilateral pre-donation

Saglam, Ismail (2022): Two-player bargaining problems with unilateral pre-donation.

Abstract

This paper characterizes conditions for two-player bargaining problems and bargaining rules under which unilateral pre-donation always yields Pareto utility gains. The paper also computes the optimal pre-donation of each player under the class of proportional bargaining rules.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: cooperative bargaining; pre-donation
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory

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