Farina, Vincenzo (2008): Banks’ centrality in corporate interlock networks: evidences in Italy.
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The idea that the governance mechanisms affect firms’ performance is well acknowledged in management literature. The settings prevailing in governance studies explain board’s roles at the light of the agency theory framework. However, a complementary perspective is focused on the acquisition of critical resources closely related to activation of external relations with the most influential actors of firm’s environment. One such kind of external relationship is called interlocking directorates and occur when an individual simultaneously sits on the board of two companies. Moreover, since banks control financial capital, that is a resource that has a universal value for all firms, they are more likely to be very important actors inside corporate networks. By analyzing interlocking directorates among listed banks and non financial firms in Italy, using the methods and theory of social network analysis (SNA), I find that banks are the most influential actors in the network and that centrality in the network enhances financial performance.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Banks’ centrality in corporate interlock networks: evidences in Italy|
|Keywords:||Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Performance, Social network analysis|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L20 - General
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
|Depositing User:||Vincenzo Farina|
|Date Deposited:||28. Nov 2008 01:14|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 22:57|
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