Effects of a uniform relative emission standard in a professional team sports league

Kato, Kazuhiko (2023): Effects of a uniform relative emission standard in a professional team sports league.

Abstract

This study theoretically examines whether a uniform relative emission standard improves a professional sports team's competitive balance and social welfare in a professional league. Our study shows that there are cases where tightening (resp. relaxing) such standards can improve competitive balance when the differences between the abatement cost conditions of different clubs are sufficiently small (resp. large). Social welfare improves when the standard is slightly tougher than an unregulated emission level standard. Furthermore, social welfare also improves when the standard set to a zero-emission level is slightly relaxed.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Competitive balance; emission standard; professional team sports league; welfare analysis
• Subjects: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q50 - General; Z - Other Special Topics > Z0 - General > Z00 - General

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