Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a model with government corruption

Keen, Benjamin and Strong, Christine (2023): Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a model with government corruption.

Abstract

This paper builds a theoretical model where corrupt government officials select the optimal amount of government spending directed toward building wealth for themselves and political allies. We refer to this type of government expenditures as rent extraction spending. Our results show that more government corruption leads to higher rent extraction spending, increased inflation, additional taxation, and lower non-rent extraction spending. The increases in inflation and rent extraction spending, however, are more muted when the corrupt country is a member of a currency union.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Corruption; Rent Extraction; Optimal Fiscal Policy; Optimal Monetary Policy.
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O2 - Development Planning and Policy > O23 - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development

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