La naturaleza de las instituciones. El debate actual.

Guzmán, Gabriel and Frasser, Cristian (2017): La naturaleza de las instituciones. El debate actual. Published in: Revista de Economía Institucional , Vol. 19, No. 37 (31 December 2017): pp. 115-132.

Abstract

This article discusses the ontology of institutions and criticizes the idea that institutions are made up solely of individual incentives and actions. It is also argued that institutions are not only constituted by the actions of individuals, and that they have their own ontology, rule-based and linguistic. Various approaches to the subject are compared and two outstanding lines of research in the literature are presented: the attempt to construct a unified theory of institutions and a proposal to include constitutive rules in game theory.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: The nature of institutions. The current debate.
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: Ontology, institutions, Searle.
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B20 - General; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology > B41 - Economic Methodology

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