“Fake news alert!”: A game of misinformation and news consumption behavior

Lodh, Rishab and Dey, Oindrila (2023): “Fake news alert!”: A game of misinformation and news consumption behavior.

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of behavioral factors in propagation of fake news. Using Spence (1978) framework, we find that the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is pooling equilibrium, i.e., fake news producers to mimic actions of true news producer, which is influenced by factors like ideology, awareness, informational utility and fear of missing out information of news- consumers. Interestingly, the chain of fake news can be broken iff degree of awareness is significantly high. A threshold level of awareness level is determined using simulation, beyond which pooling breaks despite of high influence of other factors, which throws light on possible policy interventions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Fake news, Asymmetric Information, Bayesian games, Signaling, Fact checking
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L20 - General

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