The Plurality of Economic Classifications: Toward a New Strategy for Their Investigation

Frasser, Cristian and Guzmán, Gabriel (2024): The Plurality of Economic Classifications: Toward a New Strategy for Their Investigation. Published in: Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics , Vol. 24, No. 1 (24 May 2024): pp. 1-23.

Abstract

The standard strategy involves evaluating whether economic classifications meet criteria derived from a general theory of natural kinds. The first objective of this article is to show the implementation of this strategy by various relevant authors. We argue that the standard strategy has failed due to its lack of a greater sensitivity to the role played by human interests in the design of different types of natural kinds. The second objective is to outline a new strategy for investigating economic classifications. Our departure from the standard strategy can be described as a shift from assessing economic classifications based on general theories of natural kinds to examining specific cases with the aim of theorizing about their design and application. The cases of the cost-of-living index and race are used to succinctly discuss the objectivity of economic classifications and implications for the relationship between science and democracy.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: natural kinds, economic classifications, essences, objectivity, science and democracy.
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B25 - Historical ; Institutional ; Evolutionary ; Austrian; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B4 - Economic Methodology > B40 - General; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches > B50 - General

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