Structural Presumptions for Non-horizontal Mergers in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Primer and a Path Forward

Donna, Javier and Pereira, Pedro (2024): Structural Presumptions for Non-horizontal Mergers in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Primer and a Path Forward. Published in: Review of Industrial Organization , Vol. 64, No. 5 (15 July 2024): pp. 1-43.

Abstract

The 2023 Merger Guidelines (MGs) change the Agencies’ narrative regarding non-horizontal mergers. They follow a four-pronged approach: (1) They blend horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. (2) They simplify the narrative about non-horizontal mergers. (3) They consoli- date and broaden the theories of harm in non-horizontal mergers. (4) They blend economics and law analysis. In this article, we elaborate on these points. We discuss how the MGs’ an- ticompetitive presumptions apply to non-horizontal mergers, relate them to the economics literature, and provide examples. We finish discussing the economic rationale of the struc- tural presumption involving rivals’ exit concerns due to the exercise of market power and propose a path forward.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Antitrust, 2023 Merger Guidelines, Vertical Mergers, Rivals' Exit, Double Marginalization, Merger Evaluation, Competition Policy
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K21 - Antitrust Law; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K41 - Litigation Process; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations; L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L52 - Industrial Policy ; Sectoral Planning Methods

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