Aytimur, Emre and Boukouras, Aris and Suen, Richard M. H. (2024): How Does Political Uncertainty Affect the Optimal Degree of Policy Divergence?
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Abstract
We examine how the optimal degree of policy divergence between two policy platforms in an election is affected by two types of aggregate uncertainty: policy-related and candidate-specific. We show that when the candidate-specific uncertainty is sufficiently large, policy convergence becomes optimal. We also show that when these two types of uncertainty co-exist, only purely office-motivated parties result in policy convergence, in other words, any level of policy motivation of parties results in some policy divergence, making policy motivation undesirable when candidate-specific uncertainty is sufficiently large.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | How Does Political Uncertainty Affect the Optimal Degree of Policy Divergence? |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Voting; Policy Divergence; Polarisation |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General |
Item ID: | 122279 |
Depositing User: | Richard M. H. Suen |
Date Deposited: | 08 Oct 2024 13:42 |
Last Modified: | 08 Oct 2024 13:42 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/122279 |