canegrati, emanuele (2006): The Single-Mindedness Theory: Micro-foundation and Applications to Social Security Systems.
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The central purpose of this paper is to introduce a new political economy approach which explains the characteristics of Social Security Systems. This approach is based on the Single-Mindedness Theory (SMT), which assumes that the more single-minded groups are able to exert a greater power of influence on Governments and eventually obtain what they ask. Governments are seen as voting-maximizer policy-makers, whose unique goal is winning elections. Using an OLG model and a probabilistic voting approach, I analyse a society divided into two groups, the old and the young, which only dier for their preferences for leisure. I show that, to win elections, the Government sets the marginal tax rates taking into account the numerosity and the density of groups; eventually, the old receive a positive transfer, whose burden is entirely borne by the young. Furthermore, the more singleminded group (the old) is taxed with higher tax rates; this result can be explained by the necessity that the old have to find a way out to solve a free-riding problem amongst its members. Indeed, higher tax rates induce the old to retire earlier, so that retirees may have more time to participate in political activities and support the old group’s goals.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||università cattolica del sacro cuore|
|Original Title:||The Single-Mindedness Theory: Micro-foundation and Applications to Social Security Systems|
|Keywords:||probabilistic voting model; single-mindedness; social security systems|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D3 - Distribution > D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor > J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor > J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
|Depositing User:||Emanuele Canegrati|
|Date Deposited:||20. Dec 2006|
|Last Modified:||22. Mar 2015 01:17|
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Available Versions of this Item
The Single-Mindedness Theory: Micro-foundation and Applications to Social Security Systems. (deposited 20. Dec 2006)
- The Single-Mindedness Theory: Micro-foundation and Applications to Social Security Systems. (deposited 02. Jan 2007)