I didn’t know either: how beliefs about norms shape strategic ignorance

Hua, Tony (2025): I didn’t know either: how beliefs about norms shape strategic ignorance.

Abstract

People often avoid information to evade social obligations and justify selfish behavior. However, such behavior unfolds within a social context, where beliefs about others’ actions shape individual choices. This study examines how social expectations, shaped by perceived norms and decision framing, influence individuals’ willingness to avoid information. In a modified moral wiggle-room game, participants first predict how often others acquired information, then receive feedback about others’ information-seeking behavior before making their own decision as the dictator. The experiment manipulates (1) the feedback on norms participants receive, reflecting varying rates of information avoidance, and (2) whether they know in advance that they will be making the decision themselves, thereby inducing either a \textit{self-referential} or \textit{socially} framed perspective. Individuals were more likely to acquire information when exposed to norms favoring transparency, with pessimistic participants—those who believed ignorance was common—responding most strongly. Optimistic individuals showed little adjustment. Contrary to expectations, there was little evidence that participants distorted their beliefs about others to justify selfish behavior. However, a notable gender difference emerged: female participants, when primed with self-referential framing, were significantly less responsive to normative cues than males. Finally, an exploratory comparison with previous experiments suggests that belief elicitation itself, even in the absence of normative cues, significantly reduces information avoidance, highlighting a promising and scalable intervention for promoting transparency.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: information avoidance; moral wiggle-room; social norms; social appropriateness; experiment
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness

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