Du, Songzi (2008): A Note on Intrinsic Correlation.
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In this note we characterize the strategic implication of intrinsic correlation, introduced by Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008), in the subjective correlated equilibrium setting of a complete information game. Intrinsic correlation restricts correlation devices to variables within the game, i.e. players's beliefs (and higher order beliefs) about each other's strategies, in contrast to signals or sunspots from the "outside." The characterization is a strengthening of best-response set with an injectivity condition for a certain subset identified by an iterative procedure. We also give an iterative procedure, analogous to the iterated removals of dominated strategies, that arrives at strategies consistent with our characterization, which always exist.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||A Note on Intrinsic Correlation|
|Keywords:||game theory; correlated equilibrium; rationalizability; intrinsic correlation; higher order beliefs; redundant types; epistemics|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Songzi Du|
|Date Deposited:||13. Jan 2009 07:10|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 02:21|
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