Knowledge, Preferences and Shocks in Portfolio Analysis

Steinbacher, Matjaz (2009): Knowledge, Preferences and Shocks in Portfolio Analysis.

Abstract

We simulate social network games of a portfolio selection to analyze how knowledge, preferences of agents and their level of omniscience affect their decision-making. The key feature of the paper is that preferences and the level of omniscience of agents very much determine the ways agents make their decision. While omniscient agents respond very rapidly to the changing market conditions, non-omniscient agents are more resistant to such changes. By introducing one-time shock, we found that its efficiency depends on the level of omniscience of agents, with much stronger efficiency under omniscient agents.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: social networks, stochastic finance, shocks, portfolio analysis
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions; Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games

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