Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

Tasnádi, Attila (2009): Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm.

Abstract

We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Forchheimer; Dominant firm; Price leadership
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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