Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises

Chopard, Bertrand and Langlais, Eric (2009): Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises.

Abstract

We compare the influence of bankruptcy law on the risk of default and the rate of liquidation by banks. We show that it depends on whether it is pro-creditors or pro-debtors oriented, and on the intensity of competition between banks. Then , we analyse the various tools at the disposal of public authority in order to accomdate the transition from a pro-creditors regime to a pro-debtors one. In a sense, our results suggest that there may exist a kind of consistency between the aims assigned to law, the orientation of bankruptcy law and the level of competition in the banking system.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Strategic default and bankruptcy law
• Language: French
• Keywords: default risk, law & finance, bankruptcy law
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law; K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation; K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G33 - Bankruptcy ; Liquidation; G - Financial Economics > G0 - General; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D14 - Household Saving; Personal Finance

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