Modeling a Multi-Choice Game Based on the Spirit of Equal Job Opportunities (New)

Hsiao, Chih-Ru and Chiou, Wen-Lin (2009): Modeling a Multi-Choice Game Based on the Spirit of Equal Job Opportunities (New).

Abstract

The H&R Shapley value defined by Hsiao and Raghavan for multi-choice cooperative game is redundant free. If the H&R Shapley value is used as the solution of a game, there won't be any objection to a player's taking redundant actions. Therefore, the spirit of the law on equal job opportunities is automatically fulfilled. Also, if the H&R Shapley value is used as the solution of a game, it makes no difference to the players whether they have the same number of options or not. Moreover, the D&P Shapley value, the P&Z Shapley value and the WAC value are linear combinations of the H&R Shapley value, hence, they have all the same dummy free properties and the independent property as does the H&R Shapley value. Finally the N&P Shapley value is not redundant free.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Shapley value, multi-choice cooperative game, redundant free, independent of non-essential players.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K31 - Labor Law

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