ЭНДОГЕННЫЕ ГРАНИЦЫ И РАСПРЕДЕЛЕНИЕ ВЛАСТИ В ФЕДЕРАЦИЯХ И МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ СООБЩЕСТВАХ

Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich (2009): ЭНДОГЕННЫЕ ГРАНИЦЫ И РАСПРЕДЕЛЕНИЕ ВЛАСТИ В ФЕДЕРАЦИЯХ И МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ СООБЩЕСТВАХ. Published in:

Abstract

Economic policy in the modern world is mostly an outcome of interaction of numerous territorial centers of authority (countries or regions). However, the borders between these regions and the degree of centralization of economic decision-making in the system are endogenous to the internal logic of its development. This book surveys the literature on economics of conflicts and endogenous decentralization, dealing with the structure and borders of jurisdictions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation
• Language: Russian
• Keywords: Eoconomic policy; centralization; decentralization; federalism
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations

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