Wolff, Irenaeus (2009): Counterpunishment revisited: an evolutionary approach.
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Evolutionary game theory has shown that in environments characterised by a social-dilemma situation punishment may be an adaptive behaviour. Experimental evidence closely corresponds to this finding but yields contradictory results on the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment if players are allowed to retaliate against their punishers. The present study sets out to examine the question of whether cooperation will still be part of an evolutionary stable strategy if we allow for counterpunishment opportunities in a theoretic model and tries to reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings from the laboratory. We find that the apparent contradictions can be explained by a difference in the number of retaliation stages employed (one vs many) and even small differences in the degree of retaliativeness.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Counterpunishment revisited: an evolutionary approach|
|Keywords:||Public goods; Strong reciprocity; Conformism; Counter-punishment; Evolution of behavior|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C90 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Irenaeus Wolff|
|Date Deposited:||25. Aug 2009 08:13|
|Last Modified:||19. Mar 2015 10:58|
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