What is the Cost of Venting? Evidence from eBay

Li, Lingfang (Ivy) (2008): What is the Cost of Venting? Evidence from eBay.

Abstract

This paper uses data collected from eBay's website to identify why buyers fail to leave (negative) feedback in online markets. Empirical results con¯rm that the fear of retaliation may be an important motivation for buyers not to leave (negative) feedback, while the time and effort cost of reporting may be not.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: reputation, feedback, asymmetric information
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade ; e-Commerce; L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software

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