Optimal Taxation in Dynamic Economies with Increasing Returns

Mino, Kazuo (2000): Optimal Taxation in Dynamic Economies with Increasing Returns.

Abstract

This paper studies optimal taxation in dynamic economies with increasing returns. We show that if there exists a stable open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimal rate of tax on capital income in the steady state is negative in order to eliminate the wedge between the private and the social rate of return to capital. This result also holds when the government expenditure has a positive effect on production activities of the private agents. In contrast, if the government takes a feedback strategy and if the government budget is balanced in every period, then the optimal capital income taxation rule obtained under the open-loop strategy may be violated. It is, however, shown that if the government can borrow from the public, the negative capital income tax rule may be established even under the feedback policy rule.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: optimal tax, increasing returns, differential game, open- loop policy, feedback policy
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C90 - General; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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