Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining

Andaluz, Joaquín and Marcén, Miriam and Molina, José Alberto (2009): Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining.

Abstract

This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that, for the spouse who takes the second decision, a greater discount factor increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Family Bargaining; Stackelberg Game; Family Good.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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