Weber, Tjark
(2009):
*Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.*

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## Abstract

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a well-known theorem from the field of social choice theory. It states that every voting scheme with at least 3 possible outcomes is dictatorial or manipulable. Later work on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem frequently does not distinguish between alternatives and outcomes, thereby leading to a less general statement that requires the voting scheme to be onto. We show how the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can be derived from the seemingly less general formulation.

Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem |

Language: | English |

Keywords: | Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; infeasible alternatives |

Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations |

Item ID: | 17836 |

Depositing User: | Tjark Weber |

Date Deposited: | 13 Oct 2009 04:33 |

Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 22:32 |

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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/17836 |