Weber, Tjark (2009): Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem.

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Abstract
The GibbardSatterthwaite theorem is a wellknown theorem from the field of social choice theory. It states that every voting scheme with at least 3 possible outcomes is dictatorial or manipulable. Later work on the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem frequently does not distinguish between alternatives and outcomes, thereby leading to a less general statement that requires the voting scheme to be onto. We show how the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem can be derived from the seemingly less general formulation.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  GibbardSatterthwaite theorem; infeasible alternatives 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations 
Item ID:  17836 
Depositing User:  Tjark Weber 
Date Deposited:  13 Oct 2009 04:33 
Last Modified:  26 Sep 2019 22:32 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/17836 