Brusset, Xavier (2009): Choosing a transport contract over multiple periods. Published in: International Journal Logistics Systems and Management , Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (February 2009): pp. 273-322.
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Abstract
We offer a shipper and a carrier the choice among three contracts in which to frame their relationship. Both can also take recourse in the transport spot market. Demand and price on the spot market are dependent exogenous stochastic processes. We model the outcome of this endogenous choice of contract. The results, given in closed form, are different from those presented in the literature. Using numeric instances, we show how a choice is made and which contract would be preferred. Comparison on the variance of the economic returns are offered. The conclusions are applicable when the carrier is not capacity constrained.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Choosing a transport contract over multiple periods |
English Title: | Choosing a transport contract over multiple periods |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | transport; stochastic process; MPC; minimum purchase commitment; quantity flexibility; relational contract |
Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Item ID: | 18392 |
Depositing User: | Xavier Brusset |
Date Deposited: | 11 Nov 2009 00:07 |
Last Modified: | 05 Oct 2019 13:30 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/18392 |