Arcand, Jean-Louis and Tranchant, Jean-Pierre (2007): Institutions, mobilization and rebellion in post-colonial societies.
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We revisit the simultaneous equations model of rebellion, mobilization, grievances and repression proposed by Gurr and Moore (1997). \ Our main contribution is to clarify and improve on the underlying identification strategy by resorting to the well-known colonization instruments recently constructed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002). \ We also emphasize the role played by the institutional environment. Instrumental variables estimates for post-colonial societies reveal that the strength of the state, as captured empirically by an index of bureaucratic quality, exerts a strong preventive effect on rebellion. On the other hand, working institutions also influence the likelihood of rebellion indirectly, through mobilization. Our estimates suggest that this indirect effect increases rebellion. \ As such, the total net effect of better institutions on rebellion is ambiguous.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Institutions, mobilization and rebellion in post-colonial societies|
|Keywords:||Rebellion; Institutions; Simultaneous Equations Model|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions|
|Depositing User:||Jean-Pierre Tranchant|
|Date Deposited:||01. Jan 2010 17:27|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 12:45|
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