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Contrôle et régulation du marché boursier : un problème de risque moral

Abdelhamid, El Bouhadi and Salma, Dasser and Amale, Lahlou and Abdelkader, Elkhider (2009): Contrôle et régulation du marché boursier : un problème de risque moral.

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In most of cases, the insider trading is a behavior transgression of law, it is a practice deemed illegal by law. This practice is unfair and opaque; it distorts the confidence and equality of investors to make trading in the market. An insider acting or allows other intermediaries to act in the total absence of hazards, and thus achieve a profitable operations with the abnormal returns. The insider trading is given by using the inside (i.e., the privileged) information, not yet released or revealed publicly. In this paper we deal with the issue of ethical behavior of insider trading in the Moroccan regulated markets. Initially, we review some elements at the base of ethics of financial markets. In a second point, we highlight the legal arsenal to fight against the illegal insider trading. In fact, we shall present its administrative, civil and criminal components, we then show its usefulness and we finally formulate against it some critiques. Based on these elements and by referring to the theory of Principal/Agent in the asymmetric information, we try to model the insider behavior by extending the model to two Agents and one Principal.

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