Allocation rules for museum pass programs

Béal, Sylvain and Solal, Philippe (2009): Allocation rules for museum pass programs.

Abstract

We consider natural axioms for allocating the income of museum pass programs. Two allocation rules are characterized and are shown to coincide with the Shapley value and the equal division solution of the associated TU-game introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003).

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Museum pass program; fair treatment; Shapley value; equal division solution
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

References

[1] V. Ginsburgh and I. Zang,“The Museum Pass Game and its Value”, Games and Economic Behavior 43 (2003), pp. 322–325.

[2] V. Ginsburgh and I. Zang, “Sharing the Income of a Museum Pass Program”, Museum Management and Curatorship 19 (2004), pp. 371–383.

[3] L. S. Shapley, “A Value for n-person Games”, Contribution to the Theory of Games vol. II (H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker eds), Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1953.

[4] R. van den Brink, “Null or Nullifying Players: The Difference Between the Shapley Value and Equal Division Solutions”, Journal of Economic Theory 136 (2007), pp. 767–775.