Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games

Kinateder, Markus (2009): Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games.

Abstract

Delayed perfect monitoring in an in�nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players-reaction to it.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Repeated Game, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Folk Theorem
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games

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