Corruption Factors

Polterovich, Victor (1998): Corruption Factors. Published in: Matekon , Vol. 34, No. 4 (1998): pp. 3-15.

Abstract

Among the factors that give rise to corruption, it is suggested that three groups be distinguished: fundamental factors rooted in the imperfection of economic institutions and economic policy, organizational factors ("weakness of the government"), and societal factors that depend on the prehistory and are connected with the mass culture and norms of bureaucratic behavior. A model in which corruption equilibrium is supported by non-optimum tax policy or by slow technical progress is compared with a "societal" model, which has two Nash equilibria of the level of corruption. Recommendations for combating corruption stemming from analysis of the models are discussed.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: corruption equilibrium; norms of bureaucratic behavior; Nash equilibrium; imperfection of economic institutions
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy > E26 - Informal Economy ; Underground Economy

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