Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Quantum mechanism helps agents combat Pareto-inefficient social choice rules

Wu, Haoyang (2010): Quantum mechanism helps agents combat Pareto-inefficient social choice rules.

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Abstract

Quantum strategies have been successfully applied in game theory for years. However, as a reverse problem of game theory, the theory of mechanism design is ignored by physicists. In this paper, we generalize the classical theory of mechanism design to a quantum domain and obtain two results: 1) We find that the mechanism in the proof of Maskin's sufficiency theorem is built on the Prisoners' Dilemma. 2) By virtue of a quantum mechanism, agents who satisfy a certain condition can combat Pareto-inefficient social choice rules instead of being restricted by the traditional mechanism design theory.

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