Häseler, Sönke (2010): Trustees versus Fiscal Agents and Default Risk in International Sovereign Bonds.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_21918.pdf Download (259kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Over the last ten years, institutions such as the IMF have launched several initiatives to change market practice with respect to sovereign bond contract drafting in order to ease restructuring after defaults. The first of these, the universal adoption of collective action clauses, was embraced by the market after some hesitation. Another proposal - the more widespread appointment of trustees to represent bondholders in times of crisis, to centralise enforcement action against the debtor and thus to facilitate debt relief - has so far failed to have the desired impact. Amongst other potential reasons for this failure, the argument has been made that to vest enforcement rights in the trustee, as opposed to individual bondholder rights, would be to reduce the deterrence against opportunistic defaults and thus to exacerbate moral hazard. Using a sample of secondary market bond spreads and information on default status, this paper assesses empirically whether sovereign bonds issued under a trust structure indeed carry a higher default risk. It finds no systematic evidence of either a spread premium or higher actual default rates for bonds with collective enforcement rights.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Trustees versus Fiscal Agents and Default Risk in International Sovereign Bonds |
English Title: | Trustees versus Fiscal Agents and Default Risk in International Sovereign Bonds |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | trustee; fiscal agent; sovereign bonds; default; moral hazard; collective action clauses |
Subjects: | F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K33 - International Law K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law > K12 - Contract Law |
Item ID: | 21918 |
Depositing User: | Sönke Häseler |
Date Deposited: | 09 Apr 2010 20:19 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 16:40 |
References: | Becker, T., A. Richards and Y. Thaicharoen (2001) “Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?” IMF Working Paper, July. Bradley, M., J.D. Fox, and M. Gulati (2008) “The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market” Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 211 Buchheit, L.C. (2007) "Supermajority Control Wins Out" International Financial Law Review 26(4): 2 Buchheit, L.C. and E. Karpinski (2006) "Grenada's Innovations" Journal of International Banking and Regulation 4: 227 Buchheit, L.C. and G.M. Gulati (2002) “Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will” Emory Law Journal 51: 1317 Buchheit, L.C. and G.M. Gulati (2009) “The Coroner’s Inquest” International Financial Law Review 29(9): 22-25 Chamberlin, M.M. (2002) “Revisiting the IMF’s Sovereign Bankruptcy Proposal and the Quest for More Orderly Sovereign Work-Outs” Remarks at the conference ‘Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards’ Institute for International Economics, Washington DC Cunningham, A., L. Dixon, and S. Hayes (2001) “Analysing Yield Spreads on Emerging Market Sovereign Bonds” Financial Stability Review, Bank of England, December, 175-186 Drage, J. and C. Hovaguimian (2004) “Collective Action Clauses (CACS): an analysis of provisions included in recent sovereign bond issues”, Financial Stability Review, Bank of England, November Eichengreen, B. and A. Mody (2000) “Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? An Update and Additional Results” http://ideas.repec.org/p/cdl/ciders/1008.html EMTA et al (2003) “Marketable Bonds Package” Discussion Draft of 1/31/2003, on file with author Fisch, J.E. and C.M. Gentile (2004) “Vultures or Vanguards? The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring”, Emory Law Journal 53: 1047 Gelpern, A. and G.M. Gulati (2007) “Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study” Washington University Law Quarterly 84: 1627-1715 Gelpern, A. and G.M. Gulati (2008) “Innovation after the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Contracts Since 2003” Capital Markets Law Journal 4(1): 85-103 Goodall, C.P. (1983) “Eurobonds Issued with the Benefits of Trust Deeds” International Financial Law Review 2: 19 Group of Ten (1996) “The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises” Bank for International Settlements, www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf Group of Ten (2002) “Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses”, Bank for International Settlements, www.bis.org/publ/gten08.htm Gugiatti, M. and Richards, A. (2003) “Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets” International Finance 6(3): 415-447 Gugiatti, M. and Richards, A. (2004) “The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers” Georgetown Journal of International Law 35(4): 815-836 Häseler, S. (2008) “Individual Enforcement Rights in International Sovereign Bonds” www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2010/iss1/art1/current_article.html Häseler, S. (2009) “Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bond Contracts – Whence the Opposition?” Journal of Economic Surveys 23(5): 882-923 Herbert, A. (1987) "Why Have a Trustee for a Eurobond Issue?" Journal of International Banking Law vol. 2(1) Horn, N. (1972) Das Recht der Internationalen Anleihen, Frankfurt/Main: Athenäum Verlag International Monetary Fund (2002) “Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts – Encouraging Greater Use” www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2002/eng/060602a.pdf International Monetary Fund (2003) “Collective Action Clauses: Recent Developments and Issues” http://www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2003/032503.pdf Liu, Y. (2002) “Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds”, IMF Working Paper, www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/liu.pdf Pergam, A. S. (1985a) "Eurocurrency Credits: Legal Questions and Documentation", in: Horn, Norbert(ed.) Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in International Trade and Finance, Deventer (Netherlands): Kluwer Pergam, A. S. (1985b) "Eurobonds: Trustees, Fiscal Agents and the Treatment of Default", in: Horn, Norbert (ed.) Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in International Trade and Finance, Deventer (Netherlands): Kluwer Pergam, A. S. (1985c) "Choosing between the Trustee and Fiscal Agent for Eurobonds" International Financial Law Review 4(9): 8-11 Portes, R. (2003) “Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises: The New Old Framework” http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/4717.html Smart, A. M. H. (1982) “Fiscal Agency or Trust Deed?” International Financial Law Review 1: 18-19 Tsatsaronis, K. (1999) “The Effect of Collective Action Clauses on Sovereign Bond Yields” in International Banking and Financial Market Developments, Bank for International Settlements www.bis.org/publ/r_qt9911.pdf |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/21918 |