Polterovich, Victor (2004): Институциональные ловушки: есть ли выход? Published in: Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost' No. 3 (2004): pp. 5-16.
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Abstract
Any legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Институциональные ловушки: есть ли выход? |
English Title: | Institutional Traps: Is There a Way Out? |
Language: | Russian |
Keywords: | coordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption P - Economic Systems > P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions > P30 - General P - Economic Systems > P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies > P20 - General |
Item ID: | 22071 |
Depositing User: | Victor Polterovich |
Date Deposited: | 13 Apr 2010 13:28 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 16:37 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/22071 |