Organes de gouvernance et paradoxe démocratique: Le cas des conseils d’administration d’université

Biot-Paquerot, Guillaume (2006): Organes de gouvernance et paradoxe démocratique: Le cas des conseils d’administration d’université.

Abstract

The aims of this article is to propose a preliminary step for a university governance framework. The second step will to produce an empirical study. We will discuss about the peculiar context of the French university organizations. The contract theory framework and the organizational architecture theory could lead us in this discussion, talking about opportunistic stakeholder's behaviour. In this peculiar frame, university is just an application of the corporate governance theory. And the developpment and improvement of european higer education policies in the Lisbon declaration context makes it more topical.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Groupe Sup de Co La Rochelle
• English Title: Democratic paradox and governance mediums: the case of university boards
• Language: French
• Keywords: universités; gouvernance; conseil d’administration; présidents d’université; contrôle
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G38 - Government Policy and Regulation; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I23 - Higher Education ; Research Institutions; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods

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