Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Privatización, competencia por depósitos y desempeño bancarios

Ruiz-Porras, Antonio (2010): Privatización, competencia por depósitos y desempeño bancarios. Forthcoming in: Estudios de Economia


Download (401kB) | Preview


In this article we develop a microeconomic framework to study the relationships among privatization, competition for deposits and performance in banking. Particularly, we analyze banking privatization when competitive strategies of the Cournot and Stackelberg types are allowed. Our findings show that some conditions are necessary to justify it under the following criteria: (i) efficiency, (ii) market power/financial stability and (iii) consumption availability for depositors. They also show that privatizations are relatively easy to justify when leader-follower relationships are allowed in the banking system. Even government revenues, due to privatization, are higher when these relationships exist.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.