Colignatus, Thomas (2010): The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of June 2010.
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Economic policy depends not only on national elections but also on coalition bargaining strategies. In coalition government, minority parties bargain on policy and form a majority coalition, and select a Prime Minister from their mids. In Holland the latter is done conventionally with Plurality, so that the largest party provides the chair of the cabinet. Alternative methods are Condorcet, Borda or Borda Fixed Point. Since the role of the Prime Minister is to be above all parties and represent the nation and to be there for all citizens, it would enhance democracy and likely be optimal if the potential Prime Minister is selected from all parties and at the start of the bargaining process. The performance of the four selection rules is evaluated using the results of the 2010 Dutch Parliamentary elections. The impossibility theorem by Kenneth Arrow (Nobel memorial prize in economics 1972) finds a crucially different interpretation.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||Thomas Cool Consultancy & Econometrics|
|Original Title:||The performance of four possible rules for selecting the Prime Minister after the Dutch Parliamentary elections of June 2010|
|Keywords:||Political economy; public choice; political science; optimal representation; electoral systems; elections; coalition; impossibility theorem|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C8 - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology ; Computer Programs > C88 - Other Computer Software
A - General Economics and Teaching > A2 - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
|Depositing User:||Thomas Colignatus|
|Date Deposited:||12. Jun 2010 11:14|
|Last Modified:||31. Dec 2015 12:30|
Thomas Colignatus is the preferred name of Thomas Cool in science.
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Colignatus, Th. (2010), "Single vote multiple seats elections. Didactics of district versus proportional representation, using the examples of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands", May 19 2010, MPRA 22782, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22782/.
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